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A voluntary assignment of personalty, valid in the place of contract, will not be
apheld when opposedto the positive laws of the place where the property is situated.
A firm residing and doing business in New York, made a voluntary assignment
for the benefit of creditors, which included (inter alia) personal property in New
Jersey. By the law of the latter state this assignment was void, because it gave
preferences. After the assignment, the property was attached at the suit of creditors
in New Jersey, against whom an action was afterwards brought by the assignee of
the insolvent firm. Hed, that the title acquiredunder the attachment must prevail
over the assignment.

ACTIoN for the detention and conversion of some boilers. A.
firm of Boardman & Co., residing and doing business in the city
af New York, failed in December 1857, and then in that' city
made a general assignment to the plaintiff, then a resident of said
city, for the benefit of their creditors, giving preferences. The
assignors then had some steam-boilers in New Jersey, which had
been manufactured for them by the defendants, and for which
they. were then indebted to the defendants.
After the assignment, the defendants, residents of lNew Jersey,
sold the steam-boilers under proceedings commenced by foreign
attachment against the assignors in New Jersey, to satisfy said
demand. Plaintiff demanded the boilers, and defendants refused
to deliver them. The boilers were never removed from the premises of the defendants, but remained in front of their manufactory at the date of the attachment, and at the time of the
demand and refusal.
It appeared on the trial that an agreement giving preferences
was void in New Jersey by the laws of that state. Verdict for
defendants, affirmed at General Term of the Supreme Court, in
the First District, and the plaintiff appeals.
L T. Williams, for appellant.
-B. B. _obinson, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PECKHAM, J.-The point is here distinctly presented, and it is
the only point in the case, whether a sale in New York, legal
there, of chattels situate in New Jersey, is valid in the latter
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state as against creditors of the assignors residing there, when it
is void by the laws thereof. It is a general rule in regard to personal property, that it has no locality, no situs, but follows the
person of the owner. It is therefore governed in its transfer and
disposition by the law of the domicil of its owner, by the law of
the place where the sale is made, without regard to the law of the
locality where it may be actually situated; so that if a sale be
valid where made, it is valid everywhere: Story's Confl. of Laws,
§§ 379, 383, 384, &c.; Warren v. Van Buskirk, 13 Abbott's Pr.
R., affirmed in this court in December 1865, opinion by Justice
POTTER. If that be the universal rule, the plaintiff in this case
is of course entitled to recover. But certain exceptions are stated
in the books, which seem to be as well substantiated as the rule
itself. One exception is, that such sale is not valid in another
state, where the property is in fact situated, if it conflict with the
interests of that state or its citizens.
Huberus lays down three maxims in reference to the transfer
of property, and the effect of such transfer under different governments: "1st. The laws of every empire have force 'within the
limits of that government, and are obligatory upon all within its
bounds. 2d. All persons within the limits of a government are
considered as subjects, whether their residence is permanent or
temporary. 3d. By, the courtesy of nations, whatever laws are
carried into execution within the limits of any government are
considered as having the same effect everywhere, so far as they
do not occasion a prejudice to the rights of the other governments or their citizens." [Quoted in a note to 8 Dall. R. 370.]
Justice COWEN, when reporter, regarded the rule settled by the
cases to be "that the law of a place where the contract is made
or to be performed is to ,gover as to the nature, validity, construction, and effect of such contract; and being valid in such
place, it is to be considered valid and enforced everywhere, with
the exception of cases in which the contract is immoral or unjust,
or in which the enforcing it in a state would be injurious to the
rights, the interest or convenience of such state or its citizens;"
and cites many cases: Andrews v. iferriot, 4 Cow. 510, in note
at 511.
Judge STORY, after stating that. personal property, by the law
of England, has no locality, but must be governed by the law of
the domicil of its owner (Story's Confl. Laws, §§ 880, 831), and
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that foreign jurists whom he cites affirm the same doctrine, states
the exception to the rule substantially as before expressed, as
adjudged in different states in this country, and adds: "No one
can seriously doubt that it is. competent for any state to adopt
such a rule in its own legislation, since it has perfect jurisdiction"
over all property, personal as well as real, within its own territorial limits, nor can such a rule, made for the benefit of innocent
purchasers and creditors, be deemed justly open to the reproach
of being founded in a narrow or a selfish policy:" Ibid. § 390.
What is injurious to the rights of the citizens where the property is situate should be the subject of positive legislation, and
not left to the discretion of the courts: (Id., § 390), and so are
the authorities generally in the several states, although the rule
is sometimes more broadly expressed : Zipseyq v. TRompson, I
Gray (Mass.) 243; Vrernam v. Camp, 1 Green (N. J.) 326;
Le Boy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason 157 ; Fox v. Adams,
5 Greenleaf (Me.) 245; Ollvier v. Townes, 14 Martin (La.)
97-2; Cond. R. Sup. Ct. (La.) 606, a well-considered case.
So in Virginia and Kentucky (says Chancellor KENT), under
their statute laws, all real and personal property within the state,
is held to be bound by the attachment laws of the state, although
the owner should execute an instrument in control of it at his
domicil abroad. The rule of courtesy is held to be overruled by
positive law 2 Kent 407 ; Bishop v. .falcomb, 10 Conn. 444.
Such I believe is the rule of law in all of the states where the
law has been adjudicated, except perhaps South Carolina. The
case referred to as an authority in South Carolina of Green v.
Mowry, 2 Bailey's R. 163, I have not been able to find, except a
statement of its decision in a note in 2 Kent 408. Whether it
applied to movables or to a chose in action is not stated.
The exception is fully recognised by Lord LovGHBoR UGH in
Lill v. Warswile, 1 Hen. Bl. 693, and by the reporter in giving
the course of reasoning of the jiudge in the Exchequer Chamber,
inPhilips v. Hfunter, 2 Hen. Bl. 405. Bankrupt laws, it is now
generally held in this country, do not operate extraterritorially.
But in the case at bar, it is a question of a conflict of laws. By
the law of New Jersey it is void as to creditors. The law of
this state is of course invalid as a mere law in New Jersey; it
cannot operate there except by comity or courtesy, and as to property actually situate in New Jersey, that state has the conceded
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right to legislate. She may declare what shall transfer the title
as against her citizens, creditors of the assignor. The property
is within her exclusive jurisdiction. She protects and regulates
it. Though we may differ as to the policy or principles of her
laws, we must admit their validity. In all the books it is conceded that real property must be transferred according to the
law of its locality, because it is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the government of its locality, and because every legal
remedy in regard to it must be sought there. This is not a case
of priority of title, but of conflicting title. The law of New
York holds this sale valid, as to all property which her laws can
regulate. Her laws are of no force in New Jersey, as laws, but
by comity they are enforced as to a transfer of personal property,
valid here except where injurious to her citizens there. There is
not a decision in this state against this position, although there
are some general dicta that would permit a different construction.
If the fact accorded with the fiction, and the property were, in
fact, within the state when the assignment was made, the title
would pass, and it would not be liable to foreign attachment,
though afterward found in New Jersey.
This court, in Warren v. Van Buskirk, supra, has held that
this action would lie if tlie defendants had been residents of our
state when the assignment was made, and therefore subject to its
laws. So are the decisions generally in other states: Bullock v.
Taylor, 16 Pick. 335.
The Supreme Court in the Third District, at General Term,
lately held that the exception did not extend to a debt due from
a resident in Connecticut to a resident in this state ; but that an
assignment thereof, valid here, though invalid there by her laws,
ought to be held valid there; also even as against residents of
Connecticut, because a debt is not a corpus capable of local
position, but merely a jus incorporeal. See Thurman v. Stockwell, decided in 1865, which is sustained by two other decisions
of precisely the same character. In Speed v. M ay, 17 Penna.
State Rep. 91, it was held that an assignment of a chose in
"action due from a resident in Pennsylvania, legally made in
Maryland, was valid in Pennsylvania, although the general assignment which included the claim was not recorded as required
by the law of the latter state. So in Caskie v. W]eb8ter, 1 Wallace, Jr. 131, Mr. Justice GiuER made a like decision. Thurman'
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v. Stockwetl made a distinction between debts and movable
assigns. In Caskie v. Webster, the judge remarked: "A debt
is a mere incorporeal right. It has no situs and follows the
person of the owner." But he did not base his decision on that
distinction. In a very brief opinion he seemed impliedly to
admit that the law was against his decision as to personal property
as between different nations ; but he did not think that the different states of this Union are to be regarded, as a general thing, in
the relation of states foreign to each other. With deference, I
think the doctrine on this subject to be well established the other
way. See cases before cited, and Hfoyt v. Thompson, 19 New
York 226; ifemmon v. -ThePeople, 20 Id. 602.
This court has recognised the distinction as to a situs between
debts and movables-the latter being capable of having a situs,
not the former, as they follow the domicil of the owner: People
v. Commissioners of Tazes, 23 New York 224. TL is insisted that
great embarrassment will occur if a transfer of movables must be
made according to the law of its situs, as it is not expected that
persons will know the laws of a foreign country. This difficulty
is rather imaginary than real. The transfer is always held valid
for all general purposes, with the exception before stated. There
would seem to be no great injustice in holding that movables in
one state, which have probably been a ground of their owners obtaining credit there, should not be transferred to another state
to pay foreign debts, leaving local debts unpaid, unless it be done
in accordance with the law of their locality.
I know no decision anywhere that would sustain this action.
The cases before cited of Thurman v. Stockwell, Speed v. May,
and Caskie v. Webster, are, I think, sound law. A chose in
action cannot surely be said to have any actual situs in the place
where the debtor resides. As a general principle, it is payable at
the residence of the creditor if not expressed otherwise, and a
tender to be good must be made to the creditor. There would
seem, therefore, to be no sound basis for the debtor's state to legislate exclusively as to the legality of a transfer of that debt made
by a foreign creditor. In such case, as in all others where the
property transferred does not actually lie within the jurisdiction
of another government, a sale or a contract valid where made is
valid everywhere.
The exception that the contract cannot be enforced if it be
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immoral or unjust," will and should be rarely if ever heeded
between civilized nations. Every civilized nation should be the
sole and exclusive judge of what is moral and just in her legislation upon matters conceded to be within her exclusive jurisdiction.
This state has forbidden the taking of more than at the rate of
seven per cent. interest by the severest penalties. Lotteries,
though once allowed for literary or religious purposes, are now
declared a nuisance. So of slavery, once sustained, but now prohibited in every state of the Union. Yet a note given for slaves,
or lottery tickets, or usurious by our law if made here, if valid
by the laws of the country where made and payable, would be
sustained here.
It would, I admit, be more harmonious with the general principle that personal property has no situs, and practically, perhaps,
more convenient to hold that a sale of movables, valid where made,
should be valid everywhere. But in addition to the objection
thereto already stated, suppose the laws of the states differ, as
they sometimes do, as to what is personal and what is real
property, could it be pretended that a sale here, without deed,
of what our law calls personal and the law of New Jersey declares to be real estate, actually located there, would pass the
title to the property there ?
Whatever may be our views as to what the law ought to be in
cases like the one at bar, the decisions, harmonizing too with elementary writers, are too uniform and too numerous to warrant us
in overruling them. Should we do so, and -hold the defendant
responsible in this case, we should be in antagonism with nearly
every state in the Union, if not with all-upon a question, too,
which each state has the right to decide for itself, and generally
to enforce its decision ;- and as a general thing our decision the
other way would remain a lifeless rule, without our having the
least power to enforce it.
We think the judgment should be affirmed.
11

It is not proposed in this note to discuss the subject of the conflict of laws in
respect to involuntary assignments of
personalty. Whatever force there may
be in the regrets expressed by Chancellor
KFmT, that the law of this country had
not followed the liberal doctrine of the
English courts, the rule is now well set-

tied, that a transfer of a debtor's property under proceedings in bankruptcy
in a foreign court, will not operate to
defeat the rights which domestic creditors
may have acquired by a subsequent attachment, or in other words, that where
in such cases the law of the debtor'
domicil comes in conflict with the law
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of the situs of the property, the former
mustgiveway. The spirit of uniformity
which ought to prevail in the law, and
which tends to give it the character of a
science, would indeed seem to dictte
that an assignment, no matter whether
by operation of law or by act of party,
valid in the place where made, should
be recognised in every country where the
movable property of the assignor may
be found; but the practical inconveniences which attend the enforcement of
such a rule, and the undoubted right of
ev ry government to protect its own citizens who chance to be creditors of a
foreign debtor from the operation of a
foreign law, have led the courts of this
country to adopt a different rule: See 2
Kent's Com. pp. 405-408. This is so
well settled that it would be a mere waste
of time to cite authorities in its support.
As to assignments, however, effeeted by
act bf party alone, the decisions in this
country are not perhaps altogether harmonious, and the doctrines upon which
they profess to rest not entirely well
defined. We intend to state with great
brevity such rules as appear to be settled,
and to notice a few recent decisions upon
these points. In voluntary transfers,
then, of personal property, three classes
of laws may come into conflict:I. Those of the place where the contract was made-leges toci contractus.
2. Those of the place where the proproperty is situated-leges loci rei sitce;
and
3. Those of the place where the contract is sought to be enforced-legesfori.
The rules in regard to the application,
of the first and third classes of laws ar6
well settled. By the former are to be
regulated all such matters as relate to
the capacity of the. contracting parties
and the interpretation of the contract
itself; by the latter are governed the
nature and extent of the remedies by
which the contract is to be made good,
and the time within which the action is

to be brought. Of the former the rule
that the age at which a party is able to
enter into a binding engagement is to
be determined by the law of the place
of contract, is an instance ; of the latter
an illustration will be found in the effect
of the Statutes of Limitation which happen to be in force in the forum, and by
which the remedy for the breach of the
contract may be barred, although in the
place of making the engagement, it
might still be capable of enforcement.
But in regard to the second class of
laws specified above, more doubt exists.
It is well settled as a general rule that
personal property has no situs, and follows the person of the owner; but this
is subject to the qualification thata transfer of movables shall not have any effect
given to it in the courts of the country
where they are situated, if it contravenes
some express provision of the law. To
this qualification the decisions in the
cases of 7Wurman v. Stockwdl (see Judge
PiGoxu
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opinion), Caskiev. Webster,

I Wall. Jr. 131, and Speed v. May, 17
Penna. St. 91, are said to be exceptions,
for in those cpses the law is stated to be,
that the legal situs of movables follows
the domicil of the owner, and that the
law of the actual situsprotects the claims
of creditors domiciled there only against
transfers by operation of the law. In
the principal case, indeed, these decisions
are attempted to be based upon the distinction between mere choses in action
and corporeal movables; but that was
not the ground upon which Caskie v.
Webster and Speed v. May were decided;
and if we are to look to the reasons of
decisions as an index to future judicial
action, rather than to the bald point
actually adjudicated, we must be led to
the conclusion that the courts in Pennsylvania will give effect to the transfer
of movables valid in the place of contract, although invalid according to the
lex loci rei sits. But it must be remembered that even in that state, when a situs
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of movable property different from the
domicil of the owner is expressly recognised by act of the legislature, the law
of the situs must govern. This is illustrated by the case of Philson v. Barnes,
5:) Pennsylvania St. 230, where the
t-4ignment by a non-resident of a debt
'iue by a resident of Pennsylvania, was
held void as against a subsequent attachinent because not recorded in compliance
with the provisions of the Act of May 3d
1855. That act provides that no bond
fide purchaser, mortgagee or creditor
having a lien on the said property, before
the recording in the county where it is
situated, and not having received actual
notice of the transfer, shall be-affected or
prejudiced thereby; and it was accordingly held that the express enactment of
the statute prevented the application of
the rule in Speed v. May. It will be observed that in this case also the subject
of the assignment was a chose in action,
but that no stress seems to have been
laid uponi that circumstance. The Pennsylvania doctrine is however exceptional,
and the rule in all the other states of the
Union is the other way: See 2 Kent's
Com. pp. 407-408. And it may perhaps
be stated somewhat in these terms, that
an assignment of corporeal movables
valid in the place where it is made, will
not have effect given to it in another
country, where it contravenes an express
policy of the law against the residents
of the latter place, unless the assignment
has been perfected by change of possession. It will be observed that this statement of the rule suggests several qualifications.
I. When the party who claims to
hold the property is himself a resident
of the state where the assignment is
made, he cannot claim it adversely to
the assignment, although the transfer is
invalid according to the lex loci
rei sifts.
See Warren v. Van Buskirk-, 13 Abbot's
Practice Reports, affirmed in Court of
Appeals in 1865 ; Bullock v. Taylor, 16
VoL. XV.-34

Pick. 335. The reason of this is that
the courts of a country will only violate
that principle of comity, which requires
that sales valid where made shall be held
valid everywhere, in favor of their own
citizens, and in order to protect their
rights, and that no such violation could
be justified in favor of one who is seeking
to go contrary to the laws of his own
domicil. If, therefore, there has been an
assignment in one state valid there, but
invalid in another state, the tribunals of
the latterwill not listen to a citizen of the
former who attempts to impeach it. And
as a necessary consequence the courts
of the former state will interfere by injunction, to restrai4 its citizens from
prosecuting an execution in another state
where the property which is the subject
of the assignment is situated, and where
the assignment is invalid. See Dehon
v. Foster, 4 Allen 543.
2. Where there has been an actual
transfer of possession, the transfer will
be upheld everywhere. This is illustrated by.the comparatively recent cases
of Handford v. Paine,32 Vermont 442;
Rice v. Courtis, Ibid. 460, and Mead v.
Dayton, 28 Conn. 33. In the first of
these cases there was an assignment for
the benefit of creditors made in New
York by a resident of that state, which
included (inter alia) personalty situated
in Vermont. This assignment was valid,
according to the law of New York, but
was not in accordance with the statute of
Vermont relating to such assignments.
inasmuch as no copy of it was filed in any
county clerk's office in the latter state.
The assignees came to Vermont and took
possession of the property; and it was
held that an attachment by trustee process, subsequently issued by the Vermont creditors of the assignor, came
too late. On the other hand in Rice v.
Courtis, it was held, that, where a transfer of chattels situated in Vermont, was
not followed by the change of possession,
which was required by the policy of the
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law of that state, although no such
change was requisite under the lex loci
¢cotractus, the assignment would not
stand against a subsequent attachment.
Mead v. Dayton, supra, is also an inter.sting case. There, a debtor residing
in Connecticut, made a transfer of property situated in that state to a New
York creditor, in satisfaction of the debt,
and the transfer was consummated by
an actual delivery of possession to the
creditor in New York. Two days after
this the debtor made an assignment for
the benefit of his creditors, under the
insolvent laws of Connecticut, one of the
provisions of which was, that all transfers
made 60 days before insolvency, and in
contemplation thereof, shall be void.
The creditor subsequently happened to
come into Connecticut, and was sued in
trover by the assignee in insolvency, and
it was held that the latter could not recover. This decision was undoubtedly
correct, but one of the propositions laid
down by ELLSWORTH, J., must perhaps
be taken with some degree of qualification, viz., that a title legally acquired
under the law of the situs of the property,
is, as a general rule of law, good elsewhere, and will be maintained; for, as
will be attempted to be shown, when the
transfer is invalid, both under the le
loci contractus and the lezfori, to hold
it valid, simply because it is so regarded
by the law of the place where the chattels chance to be situated, would be paying too much regard to the latter law.
See also Koster v. Merritt, 32 Conn.
246.
3. When the property is situated in,
the place where the assignment is made,
and is subsequently removed to another
state, where the assignment would have
been invalid, it will not by such removal
become liable to execution. Thus in
Cobb v. Buswell, 37 Vermont 337, a
debtor residing in New Hampshire executed to his creditor a chattel mortgage
of goods situated in the same state, which,

under the New Hampshire law, was
valid without change of possession.
The debtor, with the consent of the creditor, subsequently brought the chattels
into Vermont, where they remained in
his exclusive possession for six months;
at the expiration of which time they
were attached at the suit of Vermont
creditors. By the law of this latter
state, a chattel mortgage without change
of possession is invalid; but it was nevertheless held, in an action brought by the
mortgagee against the attaching officer,
that the le loci contractus must govern,
that the plaintifPs lien was not divested
by the change in the situs of the goods,
and that he was therefore, entitled to
recover.
4. Choses in action are intimated by
Judge PEKznAx in the principal case to
be an exception to the general American
rule, and the cases of Speed v. 2ay, 17
:pa. State 91, and Caskie v. Webster, I
WAll. Jr., 131, are putupon that ground.
But a debt seems to have a situs to this
extent, viz., that its transfer cannot be
enforced in the domicil of the debtor if
it interferes with some positive law of
that country. See Philson v. Barnes,
50 Pa. State 230.
5. Where the lex loci contractus and.
the lex fori are the same, the question
how far the law of the situi of the property shall be recognised, becomes one
of some nicety. In the principal case it
will be observed that the assignment was
valid according to the law of the place
where it was made, and, also according
to that of the place where advantage was
sought to be taken of it; and the only
ground on which the court declined to
enforce the contract was because the
subject thereof was situated in another
state, where the contract was invalid.
By the assignment of Boardman &
Company to the plaintiff, the title to the
property in dispute passed as far at least
as the law of New York was concerned ;
but that title was held liable to be divested,
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because of the failure of the act of trans-

husband's lifetime.

As the divorce was

fer to come up to certain requirements by the English law invalid, it of course
of a statute of New Jersey. The Court became a question, after the death of the
of Appeals decided in effect that they tenant for life, whether the children born
would observe that rule of comity in during the lifetime of the first husband
favor of New Jersey, which the New were legitimate, and therefore entitled to
,Terse" law declined to observe in favor take.
"The argument in support of the
of ,ew York. For if the comity among
nations requires that an assignment of Shaws (the children) contention," said
,iovables validwhere made, shall be of the Vice-Chancellor, "that the marriage
',:udiugforce everywhere, then where the with. Shaw was a valid marriage, is based
courts of another country refuse to give it upon this proposition, that it is an estabeffect because of its violation of soi'e set- lished principle of international law, and
tled policy or positive law, that rule of therefore a part of the law of every
comity is broken. And when matters go Christian civilized country, that whenone step farther, and the validity of the soever questions arise, as the validity or
transfer comes to be tested, not in the the incidents or the consequences of a
jurisdiction where the property is situ- marriage, those questions must be deterated, but in that of the place where the mined by the courts of the country in
contract is made, it might perhaps be a- which they arise, according to the law
matter of grave doubt whether the courts of the country where the marriage was
of the latter should exhibit any great solemnized, i. e., according to the lex
tenderness towards the law of another loci contractus, and not according to the
state, which declines, on its part, to make lexfori; and applying that general proany such manifestation of regard. Rea- position to the case now before the court,
soning by analogy is undoubtedly dan- it is contended that as the marriage with
gerous ; but we may venture, for the pur- Shaw took place in Scotland, this court
pose of casting some light upon this ques- must decide all questions relating to the
tion, to allude to an illustration of the validity or incidents or consequences of
refusal of Courts to carry the rule of
that marriage by the law of Scotland;
comity to such an extent, which is to be and, that according to the law of Scotfound in the case of Wilson's Trusts, de- land (as it was asserted) the marriage
cided by Vice-Chancellor Ki-NIESLEY with Shaw was a valid marriage because
in December 1865, and reported in 1 according to the law of Scotland, the
Law Rep. Eq. 246. In that case there prior marriage with Buxton had been
was a gift by will of real and personal absolutely dissolved by the decree of the
estate situated in England, by a testator Court of Session. Such is in substance
there resident, to his grandniece for her the reasoning by which the validity of
liic, wAith remainder as to the personalty the marriage with Shaw and the conseto her children, and as to the realty to
quent legitimacy of the children are
her first and other sons lawfullybegotten. maintained. Now it is curious to obThe grandniece married in England ; serve how the whole argument is founded
but subsequently obtained a divorce a upon the tacit assumption, that it is comcincalo from a Scottish court-the hus- petent to the Court of Session in Scotband having been induced to go to that land to ignore or to violate the very
country and reside there a sufficient time principle of internationallaw upon which
in order to give the courts jurisdiction. the argument rests, and which it is
The lady then married again in Scot- asserted is binding upon the EngliSh
land, and had issue born during the first courts. I say that to assert the validity
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of the Scotch divorde, upon which alone
the validity of the marriage with Shaw
depends, is to assert that the Court of
Session in Scotland is not bound by that
iinciple of international law before
juentioned, viz., that all questions as
to the validity or incidents or consequences of a marriage are to be decided
according to the lex loci contractus, i. e.,
the law of the country where it was
solemnized. The marriage with Buxton
was solemnized in England, where both
-iere domiciled. By the English law
of marriage an English marriage is absolutely indissoluble by the sentence of any
court (of course I am speaking of the law
as it stood at the time of the transactions
in question, which was long before the
passing of the act establishing the
Divorce Court). The law of this country did not recognise the right or authority of any court, whether domestic
or foreign, to dissolve an English marriage for any cause or upon any pretext
whatever, and any decree or judgment,
or sentence of any foreign court purporting to dissolve such marriage, is
treated as a mere nullity. This was
solemnly decided in Lolley's Case. In
decreeing a dissolution of the marriage
with Buxton, the Court of Session took
upon itself to disregard- the quality of
indissolubility which the law of England
attaches to an English marriage, and
dealt with the marriage with Buxton,
not according to the law of England,
where it was solemnized, but according
to the law of Scotland, i. e., not according to the lex loci contractus, but according to the lex for. In so doing, the
Scottish court violated that very principle of international law which is now
invoked by the Shaws as a reason for
maintaining the validity of the marriage
with Shaw. The sentence of divorce,
pronounced by the Court of Session,
must be treated by this court and by
every English court as a mere nullity,
and as wholly inoperative to dissolve the

marriage with Buxton ; and as that marriage remained undissolved, of course
the marriage with Shaw was not a valid
marriage."
We have made this long extract fromthe Vice-Chancellor's 'opinion, because
the law seems to be there stated with
great clearness and force; and if we take
the rule to be as there laid down, we
arrive at the conclusion that, if the law
of one country declines to recognise the
character and extent of the binding force
of a contract made in another, the courts
of the latter country are not bound by
any principle of comity in favor of the
former, when any question arising out
of the transaction comes up for adjudication. Applying this, then, to the facts
of the principal case, it does seem rather
strange that the law of New York should
recognise in favor of New Jersey, a
violation of the rule of comity, which
requires that a transfer of movables,
valid where made, should be held valid
everywhere; while the law of New Jersey refuses to give effect to that rule.
For, as has been already stated, the
general rule 'undoubtedy is, that a sale
of movables valid where made shall be
held to be valid everywhere, and what
has been called an exception to the rule,
viz., that such an effect will not be given
to the contract when it contravenes some
express provision of the law of the situs
is only in trnh a violation of it. And
the question then is, whether that violation shall obtain only in the courts of
the place of the situs, or whether the tribunals of the place of contract also shall
give effect to that violation, and refuse
to lend the assistance of the courts to
the enforcement of a valid contract
against persons within their jurisdiction,
simply because the subject thereof is personal property within another forum.
If the ground of this decision is correct,
then a sale in New York valid by the
laws of that state will not be there enforced, because the chattels which are
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the subject of it are situated in Yew Jer.- y - and personal property will be consilered to have a ,itus as ~uclh as real
property, and its transfer would in all
cases be regulated by the law of the
sits. It will be observed that Judge
Pacxmt.v in the beginning of his opinion says, "the point is here distinctly
presented, and it is the only point in the
case, whether a sale in New York, legal
there, of chattels situated in New Jersey, is valid in the latter state as against
ereditors of the assignors residing there,
when it is void by the laws thereof."
It is submitted that this statement of the
point before the court is not strictly
accurate. For the question is not whether the assignment shall 'e held valid
by the laws of New Jersey, but whether
it shall be held invalid by the courts of
New York, because it is so held by the
fex loci rei sita, or in other words, whethe lex loci rd silo is of such force that

it will bear down both the lex loci contrarets and the lexJbri together.
These criticisms upon the ground of
this decision in the principal ease are
snbmitted with no small diffidence, and
with the decision itself we are not lisposed to quarrel. The boilers appear
never to have left the possession of
Boardmau & Co, and in that case they
had an undoubted right to retain them
even against a valid assignee, until the
price was paid; but the decision would
appear more satisfactory, if the grounds
upon which it is reted had letn different. We cannot conclude these few remarks, without expressing our regret
that the law upon this subject has been
overlaid with so many distinctions and
refinements ; and that the simple rule of
holding a voluntary -ssignment of maovables, valid where made, to be valid
everywhere, has not been strictly adhered to.
G. T. B.

SuPreme Court of Maine.
CYNTHIA S. LEATHERS, ADM'X., v. JAMES GREENACRE.
At common law, a will of personal property, written in the testator's own hand,
without seal, though no witnesses were present at its publication, is good; and no
particular forra of expression is material, if only the testator's intention is manifest.
By R. S., c. 74, § 18, " a soldier in actual service, or a mariner at sea, may
dispose of his personal estate and wages," as he might have done under the common law.
The terms "in actual service," and "engaged in an expedition,'. are synonymous.
The term "expedition" is not to be confined to that movement of the troops
which immediately precedes the actual conflict and shock of battle.
If, during the late rebellion,-and after he had been mustered into the military
service of the United States, but while .he remained in barracks, or while thus
quarteret at any military station in one of the loyal states not exposed to the incursions of the enemy, and before he had crossed over to the scat of war with his regiment to take part in the hostilities existing there, and before he had begun to move
under military orders against the foe,7-a soldier had made a will without observing
the usual statute formalities, it would not be deemed the will of a "soldier in
actual service," and therefore not entitled to probate as such.
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But having marched into the enemy's country from which he never returned, and
encamped among a hostile population, and acting in conjunction with soldiers who
were confronted by the rebel army, although he was in'winter quarters and not, at
the time of making his will, occupied with any present movement of the troops,
bixt was on some service detached from his own regiment, he would be deemed a
at common law.
",oldicr in actual service," and his will be sustained if good
In August 1862, J. B. L. enlisted in the Ist regiment of -Maine cavalry, and
was thereafterwards, in the same month, mustered into the U. S. military service.
March 6th 1863, while lying in camp at Stafford C. H., Va., he wrote a long letter
to the defendant (with whom he had previously deposited the two notes mentioned
in his letter), in which he said :-"1 As life is uncertain, I will give you my wishes
in regard to my property, if I should fall here." "The face of the note that" G.
H. L. " owes me and now in your hands, and also the note against" C. S., ICand
interest, I want you to distribute among my brothers and sisters as you think proper, and all other property to my wife (naming her), and for her to pay my debts,"
(signed.) March 2d 1864, he started on a raid to Richmond in company with
others under military orders, was captured and died in prison, March 16th following :-Hed, that J. B. L. was a "soldier in actual service," when he wrote the
letter, and that it was a will entitled to probate.

THE plaintiff, widow of John B. Leathers, formerly of St.
Albans, having been duly appointed admiuistratrix upon her late
husband's estate, brought this action of trover against his brotherin-law under the following circumstances: John B. Leathers was
mustered into the service of the United States in August 1862,
and continued in the service until his death, which took place at
Richmond, where he was held a prisoner by the rebels, March
16th 1864. A few days after his enlistment, and before he left
this state, he intrusted to the defendant two promissory notes payable to himself, with written directions to "collect them, and let
any one of his friends who needed them most" have the proceeds,
in case he gave no further directions. The defendant collected
one of the notes and invested the proceeds in a bond of the city
of Bangor, which he now holds, together with the other note
which, though admitted to be good, has never been collected.
Previous to his enlistment, Leathers had been engaged in trade
at St. Albans in company with 'one Tracy, but the business was
broken up and the partnership dissolved in the fall of 1861, by
the attachment and sale (at the instance of their creditors) of
the company property, which proved insufficien-t to meet their
indebtedness, from $300 to $500 of which still remains unpaid.
Leathers also owed private debts still unpaid to the amount of at
least -600. His entire property, real and personal, aside from
this claim against the defendant, according to the appraisal in
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the inventory, was but a little more than $1000, and no allowance
or provision has been made for the widow. After her appointment as administratrix, and before the commencement of this
suit, she made a demand upon the defendant for the bond and
note, and he declined to give them to her, though then and still
in his possession. He bases his defence upon a letter from
Leathers written at Stafford Court-House, Virginia, March 6th
1863, containing matter of the following tenor:"Stafford Court-House, Va., March 6th. 1868.
"As life is uncertain, I will give you my wishes in regard to
my property if I should fall here in the service of my country.
The face of the note that Gilbert H. Leathers, my brother, owes
me, and now in James Greenacre's hands, an also one other
note, against C. Skinner, of St. Albans, and interest, I want you,
James Greenacre, to distribute among my brothers and sisters as
you think proper, and all other property to go to my wife Cynthia
and for her to pay my debts, there being only one debt due from
me, which is due Alphonso D. Leathers, for other debts are company debts.
JOHN B. LEATHERS."
D. D. Stewart, for plaintiff.
.S. Rowe, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BARROW, J.
(After stating the facts).-The defendant has
stipulated, and the plaintiff agreed that, if any action by the
Probate Court upon the paper above recited would make the
defence effectual, the case shall be treated in the same manner as
if such action had been had before the commencement of this suit,
the defendlant binding himself immediately to take the necessary
steps in the Probate Court in accordance with the opinion. If
the paper had been allowed by the Probate Court as the will of the
deceased, it would have become the duty of the plaintizF forthwith
to return into the Probate Court her letters of administration, .
which constitute her authority to commence and prosecute this
action, and she could thereafterwards represent the estate only
under letters testamentary or letters of administration with the
will annexed, neither of which have ever issued to her. Under
the foregoing stipulations, it becomes necessary, then, for the
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court to determine whether this paper is entitled to probate as
the will of John 13. Leathers.
No one who reads it can doubt that it falls within the general
definition of a will, which is said upon good authority to be "the
declaration of a man's mind as to the manner in which he would
have his property or estate disposed of after his death :" 1 Jarman on Wills 1.
It is not attested according to the implied requirements of R.
S. c. 74, § 1.
Was the decedent relieved by his peculiar position from observing the formalities required in ordinary cases? Is it a valid will
at'common law ?
Wills are of two sorts-written and verhal, or nuncupativethe latter depending merely upon evidence of the declarations
of the testator, made ore tenus, in the presence of witnesses, and
subsequently reduced to writing.
Although Swinburne lays it down (pt. 1, § 3, pl. 19), that the
naming of an executor is indispensable to the validity of a will,
yet that idea has long been abandoned in England, and never
was received on this side of the Atlantic; so that we need trouble
ourselves with no supposed distinction between wills and testamentary papers arising from that source. And even -while the
distinction prevailed in England, such a paper was wont to be
held. binding upon the administrator under the appellation of a
codicil, the ancient definition of which was, according to Swinburne (pt. 1, § 5, pl. 2), "a just sentence of one's will touching
that which any would have done after their death, without the
aypointing of an exeeutor"-an "unsolemn will," differing only
from the general definition which the same ancient writer had
previously given (pt. 1, § 2) of a will, in the single point that
no executor was named therein. The definition is obsolete.
With us it is not uncommon to add a codicil for the purpose of
naming an executor where it hat been omitted in the will ; and a
paper of unmistakeable testamentary character is none the less a
will because no executor is therein named. Our statutes provide for the granting of administration cum testamento annexo in
such cases.
It is unnecessary to determine whether, if the letter is a valid
will, there is a constructive appointment of the plaintiff as executrix of it. She does not sue in that character; and, as we have
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already seen, if the letter is entitled to probate as the will of
Leathers, under the stipulations in this report it is fatal to the
plaintiff's suit.
At common law, a will of personal property written in the
testator's own hand, though without signature, or seal, or witnesses present at its publication, upon proof of the handwriting
was held good. Nor was any particular form of expression
material, if only the testator's intention was manifest.
Letters of a character similar to the one produced by the
defendant here, and even less definite and intelligible than this,
have been repeatedly established as valid wills of personal estate:
iubberfield v. Browning, 4 Ves. Jr. 200, in not.s; 3 Dane's
Abr. c. 90, art. 12, § 1 ; Boyd v. Boyd, 6 Gill & Johns. 25.
Before the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. -a)' the ecclesiastical courts, to whose jurisdiction the establishment of testaments
relating to personal estate belonged, required no ceremonies in
the publication thereof, or the subscription of any witnesses to
attest the same: 1 Roberts on Wills 147, 148.
It is to be observed that the restrictions of that statute did hot
extend to wills made by. any soldier being in actual military
service, or any mariner or seaman being at sea. Moreover, as
that statute did not extend to the provinces, and never has been:
adopted in this state, it is no part of our common law, although
we have statutory provisions in many respects similar, and some
of them directly copied from it.
The validity of wills of personal estate, then, is to be determined by the rules and principles of the common law in this
state, except so far as it has been changed by our own statutes.,
And by R. S., c. 74, § 18, soldiers in actual service or mariners
at sea are so far relieved from the formalities to be observed by
others in the making of their wills, that, either by written will or
by nuncupation, they may dispose of their personal estate and
wages as they might have done *under the common law.
It is true that, since the mass of the people have grown more
familiar with the use of the pen, nuncupations have deservedly
fallen' into disfavor, as being more likely to be the subjects of
fraud, perjury, mistake, or misrccollection. And in fact it was
an attempt to establish a will of this sort (in the case of Cole v.
Mordaunt, given in note to 4 Yesey 196) by means of gross fraud
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and perjury, that brought about the enactment of the statute 29 Car.
2, c. 8, commonly called the Statute of Frauds, to which we have
before referred. And now, in England (by statute 1 Vict., c. 26),
and in Massachusetts (General Statutes, c.92, § 9), and in New
York, by the revised code, the right to make nuncupative wills id
confined strictly to the soldier in actual service and the mariner
at sea. As to any one belonging to either of these privileged
classes, the right to dispose of his personal estate and wages still
remains substantially as under the civil law in the days of Justinian. "1Quoquo enim modo voluntas ejus suprema inveniatur,
sive scripta, sive sine scriptura, valet testamentum ex voluntate
And in our state, under R. S., c.74, § 18, nuncupations may
still be made by other citizens under restrictions which have long
obtained, and which it is unnecessary in this case to discuss.
For, whatever may be said of the extraordinary caution which
should be exercised by the courts in the establishment of nuncurative testaments, an olographic will, like the one before us in
the present case, stands upon a quite different footing, and, proof
of its authenticity being made, the main question is: Was the
position of the writer such that he might lawfully make a wil
without observing the customary formalities?
The privileged military testament was first recognised when
the army under Julius Coesar became the ruling power in Rome.
As finally confirmed and limited by the edicts and rescripts
of that great lawgiver and succeeding emperors, tle privilege
granted was (as appears in Cooper's Justinian, lib: I., tit. XI.,
p. 118, et seq.) substantially this. The strict observance of formalities in the construction and execution of testaments was dispensed with in favor of all military persons-propter nimiam
imperitiam eorum-on account of their unskilfulness in these
matters. (Note here the reason whyj the privilege was con-'
ferred.) "For although they should neither call the legal number of witnesses nor observe any other solemnity, yet they may
make a good testament".-videlicet, cum in expeditionibus occupati sunt-that is to say, "when they are in actual service ;"
"but when soldiers are not upon an expedition, and live in their
own houses or elsewhere, they are by no means entitled to claim
this privilege." And again: "This privilege was granted by the
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imperial constitutions to military men to be enjoyed"-quatenus
militant et in eastris degu7it-" only during actual service and
while they lived in tents. For, if veterans after dismission, or
soldiers out of camnp, would make their testaments, they must
pursue the forms required" of other citizens. "And if a testament be made in camp, and the solemnities of the law are not
adhered to, it will continue valid only a year after dismission
from the army."
"Officers of the army and soldiers, who are actually in an
expedition and not in a condition to observe all the formalities
which the law requires in testaments, are relieved from observing
those which their present state does not allow them to comply
with :" Domat's Civil Law, vol. 5, p. 296.
And such substantially is the privilege granted to the soldier
under our laws, propter nimiam imperitiam ejus, and while
he is in such a position that it cannot be reasonably presumed that he might obtain instruction from those learned in
the law.
What now is the true meaning of the phrases " engaged in an
expedition," "in actual service," (for the decisions recognise
them as synonymous) ?
That there must be actual warfare, in the prosecution of which
the soldier is at the time engaged, is clear.
The will of a soldier, made while he is quartered in barracks at
home, must be executed with the formalities required of others:
Drammond v. Parish,3 Curteis 522.
And the sariie is true if, having left home, he is thus quartered
in a peaceful colony: White v. Repton, 8 Curteis 818.
So, where an officer in command of the Mysore division of the'
army stationed at Bangalore, a large and strongly fortified town
in Southern India, made his will at that place; though he died
while on a tour of inspection of the troops under his command:
In the aoods of gill, 1 Robertson 276.
And, in the case from 1 Spink's Eccles. & Ad. Reports 294,
Bowles v. Jackson, which, with such as those just before referred
to, plaintiff's counsel claims as decisive in his favor, where the
deceased, a captain in the infantry stationed with his regiment at
Neemuch in Bornibay in 1839, received orders, August 14th, to
march on August 22d, to attack the citadel of Joadhpore, and
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thereupon made his will, August 20th, duly signed but attested
by only one witness, and set out, August 22d, upon thb expedition
as commanded, from which expedition he never returned, dying
October 18th at Musserabad, it seems to have been held that the
military privilege did not apply ; that the officer could not be said
to have been in exyeditione when the will was made; that the
orders to march were not immediate; that the deceased had full
time to make and did make a will, but unfortunately not in accordance with the requisites of law, and therefore the will was rejected.
We have not had access to the volume, referred to, and accept the
citation as made by the diligent and learned counsel, but it is
manifest that the value of that case, as an authority in the present,
may depend upon historical and topographical facts not here
stated. If the English court viewed Jackson's will as having
been made in the peaceful presidency of Bombay, the oldest of
the British possessions in India, at Keemuch, where there was a
regular cantonment of British troops, many leagues from the contemplated scene of hostilities, and before he departed to take part
in the Affghan war (which broke out in 1839), or in some movement of the troops designed to quell the insubordination of some
petty and distant Rajah, although he was under orders to march
at a future day, the case would be simply consonant with White
v. Repton, and other cases which establish beyond question the
doctrine that the soldier must be engaged in an actually existing
warfare, and not merely belong to a garrison or standing army not
employed in hostile operations.
Doubtless if Leathers had written this letter after he had been
mustered into the service of the United States, but while he
remained in barracks at Augusta, or while thus quartered at any
permanent military depot or station in one of the loyal states not
exposed to the incursions of the enemy, before he had crossed
over into Virginia with his regiment to take part in the hostilities
existing there, and before he had begun to move under military
orders against the foe, we should feel bound to say that this was
no valid will and that it is not entitled to probate as such.
But having marched into the enemy's country, from which he
never returned, being encamped among a hostile population, and
acting in conjunction with soldiers who were confronted by the
rebel army, although he was in winter quarters, and not at the
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time of writing occupied with any present movement of the troops,
but was apparently on some service detached from his own regiment, we cannot say that he was not a soldier in actual service,
engaged in the great expedition which cost so many lives, but
which after long delays resulted in re-establishing the authority
of the government over the revolted states. The term expedition
is not to be confined to that movement of the troops which immediately precedes the actual conflict and shock of battle.
To limit the soldier's privilege to those excursions from camps
or quarters in the enemy's country which are designed to bring
on an immediate engagement, would be to defeat it for the most
part, except as to mere nuncupations, the proof of which resting
in the breasts of those who are similarly exposed may never be
made available to the soldier's friends.
A member of the First Maine Cavalry, in camp at Stafford
Court-House, the deceased was "in actual service," and "engaged
on an expedition," though the orders to saddle, mount, and ride
on the raid toward Richmond, upon which he was taken prisoner,
were not received until months afterwards. Propter nimiam
imperitiam ejus, and because he was in no condition to learn and
observe the formalities elsewhere required, valet testamentum ex
I.
voluntate ejus.
And the military testament is not to be confounded with merely
nuncupative dispositions made by those not privileged as soldiers
in actual service, or mariners at sea. And so the argument which
the counsel for plaintiff bases upon the statements in the letters
as to the health and good corporeal condition of the writer, and
upon the length of time that elapsed after the date of the alleged
will before his death, cannot avail. If he belonged to the privileged class, he might' make a valid written testament without
being in extremis. Whether a nuncupative will made undef like
circumstances would be good, it is unnecessary here to decide.
We have seen tha t wills made under such circumstances that the
privilege attaches, are held valid for a year after the soldier quits
the service. Leathers remained in the service till his death,
and, so far as appears, was a dweller in camp until he became a
prisoner.
While it is true that the policy of the law is well settled, to
regard wills as inoperative unless executed with the formalities
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which the law requires as safeguards against imposition, it is also
true that the exemption of soldiers in actual service and seamen
at sea from the observance of these formalities has always been
liberally considered; and so it is, as MERLIN states it, that" their
form was properly to have no form."
Thus, where a surgeon in the East India Company's service
returned from England to join his regiment in India, in medical
charge of recruits, and in July 1838, when on board ship, at
Portsmouth, wrote a paper of a testamentary character, but
appointing no executor or residuary legatee, and which was moreover unattested, it was determined that administration with the
paper annexed passed to the mother of the deceased: In re Donaldson, 2 Curt. 386. And a letter written by an invalided surgeon
on his return home on board the regular line of steamers,
addressed to his brother, and containing a disposition of his property, was admitted to probate as the will of a seaman made at
sea, the writer having died before he reached England: In re
Saunders, 11 Jur. N. S. 1827.
See also Hubbard v. Hubbard, 4 Seld. 196 ; I'n the aoods of
Lay, 2 Curt. 375; Ez parte Thompson, 4 Bradford's Surr.
Rep. 154, for examples of cases where the privilege was held to
attach as to seamen at sea.
In consonance with authorities of this description, and adopting
a like liberal construction in behalf of those who went forth in
defence of our country in her recent great peril, we pafinot hesitate to say, that the paper here produced as the will of John B.
Leathers, must be considered as the privileged testament of a
soldier in actual service, and engaged upon an expedition, and
that, as such, it is entitled to probate.
In conformity then with the stipulations in the report, the
entry in this case must be,
Plaintiff nonsuit, without costs.
APPLETON, C. J., CUTTING, K NT, DIcKERSON, and TAPLEy, JJ.,
concurred.

DARK v. JOHNSTON.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
DARK ET AL. v. JOHNSTON ET AL.
An agreement was made by the owner of land with one who was to explore the
same for mineral oil, and if oil was found a part of the land was to be sold to the
explorer. Held, to be a personal license, on which ejectment would not lie by the
assignee of the covenantee.
If the licensee had held possession under the license he might have recovered in
ejectment so much of the land as he had lawfully occupied under the license.

ERROR to Common Pleas of Warren county.
Ejectment.-Samuel McGuire was the owner in fee of the land
in dispute, and lived upon and cultivated about sixty acres, the'
balance being unimproved woodland. In 1859 McGuire and
Samuel Baird entered into the following agreement:"Memorandum of agreement made this 26th day of November
1859, in Tidioute, -Deerfield township, Warren county, Pa.,
between Samuel Mequire,. of the above place, and Samuel
Baird, of Pittsburgh, Allegheny county, Pa., witnesseth:
"That the said McGuire is the owner of a farm in Tidioute, in
Deerfield township, Warren county, Pa., of about two hundred
and fifty acres, more or less, running on the Allegheny river. and
along and on both sides of the course of McGuire run, about one
mile and twenty-six rods; and also an island in said river, opposite the homestead, of about nine acres. On this land petroleum
or mineral oil may exist, and said McGuire is desirous of having
it explored, and agrees to and with said Baird as follows, viz.:=
" First. Said Baird, as full consideration for the right to sink
one or more wells or pits on the island, and four'trial wells or pits
on the farm, pays to said McGuire $100 before commencing work;
and should said Baird find oil on said island, then said McGuire
agrees to sell to said Baird the above-described island for the
sum of $500. The one hundred paid on commencing work to be
part of said sum; the remaining four hundred to be paid on
McGuire's giving him a warranty-deed for said island in fee.
"Second. Said McGuire covenants and agrees with said Baird
to grant him an exclusive right to sink wells and pits for obtaining mineral oil over the rest of said estate, on the following terms
and conditions, viz. : $100 for each and every period of ten
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years ($10 per year), for each and every well or pit that said
Baird may continuously pump oil from; the continuous pumping
of said oil to be the evidence that such wells or pits are used.
The rent for each and every well shall be paid yearly.
"It is understood and agreed on the part of said Baird, that
he will not, in boring or sinking such wells or pits, or in erecting
the necessary buildings and apparatus to obtain and refine, or
prepare for market said oil, [occupy] any part of said farm
valuable as pasture or tillable; and that any fences interfered
with shall be restored into good condition.'
"It is further understood and agreed between the parties to
this instrument, that in case the said Baird shall fail to find rock
oil on either the island or farm aforesaid, then he shall be at full
liberty to remove any buildings or machinery he may have put
up, and the $100 paid to McGuire shall be in full of every
demand.
"And,.further, should oil be found, then the right to pump oil
from the wells shall continue as the said rent is paid, as before
mentioned. For and in consideration of the above premises, we
hereby bind ourselves and our legal representatives for and to the
full performance of the above agreement in every part.
"Witness our hands and seals the above date.
"SAMUEL

N

"SAMUEL

BAIRD.

MAGUME,

[L. S.]
[L. s.1

"Witness present,
"STEWART

GwYINN,

"OfJArew York."
In pursuance of this agreement Baird commenced operations
to procure oil; seventeen wells were begun on the island, and a
considerable number on the main land. Operations were continued at an expense of about $20,000, until June 1861, when
Baird returned to Pittsburgh, Where he resided, leaving no one in
charge of the land, and gave no further attefition to it.
On the 2d of April 1861, Samuel McGuire executed to C. B.
Curtis and J-.osiah Hall, a deed of general warranty for the lands
in dispute, under which they took possession of the land, and they
or their grantees have been in possession ever since.
The plaintiffs below being assignees of Baird, then brought this
suit and got a verdict in their favor.
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S. -Dicksonand Brown .AielKelvi, for plaintiffs in error, who
were defendants below.-The instrument from McGuire to Baird
gave the latter a mere license.
I. A license, or right to a profit d prendre, will not sustain
ejectment. A writ of ejectione firmm, or trespass in ejectment,
lies where lands or tenements are let for a term of years, and the
lessee of the term has been ejected or ousted. Plaintiff must
make out title of lessor, lease, entry under the lease, and ouster.
Therefore, on those things whereon an entry cannot in fact be
made, no entry shall be supposed by any fiction of the parties.
An ejectment will not lie de piscaria in a river, nor for acommou
d prendre, or rent, or other incorporeal hereditament: Herbert
v. Laughlayn, Cro. Car. 492,; s. F. Afolineauz v. Molineaux,
Cro. Jac. 146 ; 8 Mod. 278. See also 2 Yeates 321; 9 Johns.
298; 16 Id. 184; 6 Litt. 184.
In Rex v. The Inhabitants of Old Alresford, 1 T. R. 358,
Mr. Justice ASHHURST said : "There is no doubt but that a fishing is a tenement. Trespass will lie for an injury to it, and it
may be recovered in ejectment." But in this case all the judges
were agreed that the soil passed, and therefore he was not speaking of a mere profit d prendre.
The cases usually cited in support of his view are Smith v.
Barrett and Newman v. Hoidmyfast; but in the case of the
boilary (Smith v. Barrett, Sid. 161, 1 Lev. 114) ejectment lies,
because the salt is the whole profit of the soilz--as' in a deed the
soil may pass by the word profits: 1 Salk. 228 ; Plowd. 594;
Oro. Eliz. 190'; and as to the case of common appendant or
appurtenant (Newman v. Holdmyfast, Sh. 54), Stephens in hig
N. P., p. 1392, puts it upon the one ground, that it- was
"demanded as such, with the land in respect of which it is
claimed; and by giving possession of the land, the sheriff gives
that of the common."
II. A license is revocable, tlhough granted by deed and for
consideration paid: 3 Kent 452.
In commenting upon Wood v. Lake, Sayers .3,which was
ruled upon the strength of Webb and Paternoster,Palm. 71, Lord
St. Leonards, who had "forcibly attacked" its authority in the
earlier editions of his work on Vendors and Purchasers, in his
last edition (the 13th, 1857), says: "The writer thought that
the case in Palmer did not bear out the judgment in Wood and
VOL. XV.-35
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Lake. The case was, however, followed in several recent cases.
But in the case of Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, it was
held, that no incorporeal inheritance, or for life or years, affecting land, can be created without deed, and that a mere license is
revocable, although granted by deed, and for a price paid." A
license doth not extend but to him to whom it is given, and cannot
be granted over (this was a case affecting personal property): Howes
v. Ball, 7 B. & C. 481. See also Jamieson v. Milleman, 3 Duer
257; 15 fl1. 397; 13 M. & W. 808; 11 A. &E. 34; 8 Metc. 34.
IH. If the licensor conveys the land to another, a license to
enjoy an easement is determined at once, without notice to the
licensee of the transfer, and he is liable in trespass if he afterwards enters upon the land: Wallis v. Hfarrison, 4 M. & W.
538 ; Coleman v. Foster, 37 E. L. & E. Rep. 489.
IV. The right of Baird was a mere license, and was revocable
and unassignable: Doe v. Wood, 2 B. & Ald. 719, Riddle v.
Brown, 20 Ala. 412, and Grubb v. Bayard, 2 Wall. 81, are
directly in point. The leading case in this country upon the
subject of license, is that of Princev. Case, 10 Conn. 375, and
annotated in 2 Am. L. C. 728.
In deciding whether the right conferred is a license or a grant,
the first question must always be, what is the s&*.ect of the contract? As here, the right to explore, or the oil found? But
even where the contract would operate, as a valid grant if executed, it may still be Tevoked, if not yet acted, upon..
"A license is technically an authority to do some one act or
series of acts on the land of another, without passing any estate
in the land. Such as a license to hunt in another's land, or cut
down a number of trees. These are held to be revocable when
executory, unless a definite time is fixed :" Clook v. Stearns, 11.
Mass. 583. See also Emerson v. Fisk, 6 Greenl. 200; Jackson
v. Babcock, 4 Johns. 418; Vandenurgh v. Van Bergen, 13
Johns. 212; Jaceson v. Mai, 16 Johns. 184.
[We regret that we have not been furnished with the argument.
for the defendant in error.-ED. A. L. R.]
Opinion by STRONG,
The agreement upon
to recover in ejectment
fiat induced it was a

J.
which the plaintiffs below rest their right
is singularly obscure. The avowed motive
desire of the owner of the land that an
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exploration might be made to ascertain whether it contained mineral oil. But what rights it was intended to give to, Samuel Baird
the explorer, it is difficult to determine from the language used
by the parties. And the difficulty is increased by the fact that
the stipulations respecting the island and those respecting the
farm are diverse, and yet they are mingled together. So far
as it relates to the conveyance of any interest in the lands,
the contract is executory. No doubt it amounts to an engagement to sell the island on a certain contingency, but there
is no absolute covenant to sell. McGuire undertook to make
a conveyance- of the island if Baird should find oil upon it.
To allow to the agreement a reasonable construction, it must of
course be held that the discovery of oil must be -made within
a reasonable time. But what interest, if any, did McGuire
agree to give in the body of the farm ? The plaintiff insists that
the agreement amounts to a sale of'the oil itself; and that the oil
being a part of the land, is a corporate hereditament, to recover
possession of which ejectment will lie. But if it be conceded that
by the contract there was a grant of the oil, it by no means follows from that alone that ejectment is maintainable. Oil is a
fluid, like water; it is not the subject of property except while in
actual occupancy. A grant of water has long been considered
not to be a grant of anything for which an ejectment will lie. It
is not a grant of the soil upon which the water rests: Coke Litt.
4, V. It would confound all legal notions were it held that an
action can be maintained for the recovery specifically of the possession of a subterranean" spring or stream of water, no matter
whether the waters are mineral or not. There is a manifest difference between a grant of all the coal or ore within a tract of
land, or even the grant of an exclusive right to dig, take, and
carry away all the coal in the tract (which we held in Caldwell v.
Fulton, 7 Casey 475, to be a grant of a corporeal interest), and a
grant of the waters in or on the tract. The nature of the subject
has much to do with the rights that are given over it, and to us it
appears that a right to take all the oil that may be found in a tract
of land, cannot be a corporeal right. The contract in this case is:
in some particulars, not unlike that under consideration in Clement
et al. v. Youngman et al., 4 Wright 341. Like that it is the
grant of an exclusive right, but no present consideration is agreed
to be paid for the oil. It contains no covenants of the grantee
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either to search for.the oil, or to become a lessee of wells on the
main farm, and what is exceedingly impzrtant it provides for a
future conveyance of the island and assurance of rights on the
main land, in the event that oil should be discovered. This provision is very clearly indicative of an intention that no present
estate should pass, either corporeal or incorporeal. If the agreement referred to in Clement et al. v. Youngman et al., supra,
was correctly ruled to convey no corporeal hereditament such
as is essential to the maintenance of an ejectment, much more
must the contract here be held to be no grant of a corporeal interest, in any portion of the farm. There is also no distinct assertion that Baird should have all the oil. At most, his rights are
made to extend only to so much as he might find. McGuire does
indeed covenant to grant an exclusive right to sink wells for
obtaining oil, but even after the grant shall be made it is only for
such wells as he shall continuously pump oil from, that the covenantee is to receive payment. The only clause which expressly
grants any right to take the oil is the last, and that is: "Should
oil be found, the right to pump oil from the wells shall continue,"
as the rent is paid. *This surely is not a grant of all the oil. Moreover, Baird is expressly authorized to remove his buildings or
machinery, in case he fail to find oil. This provision is unnecessary if a corporeal right was granted. And the removal of buildings, &c., determine all rights under -he contract. In such a
contingency, the $100 paid are to be in full of every demand.
These stipulations point to an intention that nothing more was in
contemplation of the parties than a licens -before the proposed
exploration should prove successful, and we think a license is all
that Baird acquired. He obtained not even: an easement on the
land, for it is essential to an easement that there should be both
a dominant and a servient tenement. But the right or privilege
assured by this contract was, not for any other tract of land, but'
solely for Baird himself.
Regarding then the agreement, not as a conveyance of corporeal estate, but as a license, we proceed to the consideration of its
effect. Generally a parol license is revocable at the pleasure of
the licensor, and it is nevertheless revocable because a consideration has been paid for it: Wood v. Leadbitter, 14 M. & W. 838.
It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Maguire might have revoked
the license in this case, had it been given by parol at any time
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before Baird had expended labor or money on the faith of it, in
prosecuting the explorations. By so doing, he might have subjected himself to a liability to respond in damages, but his right
to withdraw the permission given would have been inseparable
from the nature of the arrangement. Here, however, the license
was not parol, it was given by deed. It is not so clear that a
license given by deed is revocable at the pleasure of the grantor.
See the Law of Mines, Minerals and Quarries, by Arundel
Rogers, a late English elementary treatise, page 318. Without
pausing to inquire how this may be, how stands the case when a
license has not only been granted by deed, but acted upon, and
when the licensee, on the faith of it, has made large expenditures ? It must be admitted that the license to Baird authorized
him to go upon the land, to bore or sink wells, and to erect the
machinery and buildings necessary for obtaining oil, or at least
for ascertaining whether -it existed on the land. The privilege
included a right to occupy so much of the surface as was required
to enable him to enjoy the -main thing grgnted. These privileges, though not all expressly given, are plainly implied. They
would be, were no reference made -to them. They are, however,
spoken of in such a manner as to leave no doubt that it was
intended they should go with the right to sink wells. And the
evidence given at the trial shows that in the enjoyment of his
license Baird did occupy portions of the land, that he expended
a large sum of money in sinking wells, and the verdict of the jury
establishes that there has been no abandonment.
It has been held in this state that even a parol license executed
may become an easement upon the land, and that when acts have
been done by one party in reliance upon a license granted to
another, the latter will be equitably estopped from working it to
the injury of the former: Lefevre v. .Lefevre, 4 S. & R. 241;
Resick v. Kern, 14 Id. 267; Lacy v. Arnett, 9 Casey 169.
These are cases, it is true, where the license was not personal,
but where a servitude had been imposed for the benefit of another
tenement. In them an easement was allowed in favor of the
dominant tenement, appurtenant to it, and passing with it to a
grantee of the license, as held in Me.Killip v. Me- he n, 4
Watts 817. The same reasons which were controlling in these
decisions appear to us to be. applicable to the present case.
Admitting, as we must, that we are not to confound the contin-

DARK v. JOHNSTON.

gent covenant .to sell the island, and to accept Baird as a tenant
of wells on the main land, with the antecedent rights given to
explore, we have still the facts that under the license to explore
he was in possession of certain portions of the land, that such
possession was authorized, that in taking it and continuing it
large expenditures had been made, and that neither the occupancy
itself, nor the right to maintain it, has ever been abandoned. Add
to this the fact that if oil should be discovered as a result of his
search, Baird was assured that he would be entitled to a conveyance of the island and a lease of wells on the main land, and it
would seem grossly unjust in McGuire to make all his expenditures fruitless to him, and by revbking the license deprive him of
the right, the exiectation of which induced his expenditure. If
in Lefevre v. Lefevre there was enough to raise an estoppel,
and prevent the licensor from denying to the licensee the fruit of
his expenditure, there surely is in this. Taking the occupancy
of so much land as was necessary for the allowed explorations as
being authorized, it was authorized for a consideration, and so
was the continuance of the occupation. Call this what you may,
an easement; which is an incorporeal right,, or a temporary right
to possession, defeasible, and ended when it shall be ascertained
that the land does not contain oil, it was not for Mr. MdGuire to
take it away. Neither his conveyance of the land, nor a re-entry
by himself, could deprive Baird of the rights obtained by him in
virtue of the license and the action under it.
If, therefore, the case stood upon this ground alone, we should
be of opinion that the plaintiffs below were entitled to recover so
much of the island and farm, as the licensee had taken the occupancy of for the purpose of sinking wells, and ascertaining whether oil is to be found. Thus far the disseisin of McGuire or
his grantees would be regarded unlawful, and we should feel ourselves justified in sustaining an ejectment to restore a possession
wrongfully taken away.
But this ejectment was brought by the grantees of Baird, not
by himself. We are, therefore, brought to a consideration of the
effect of his grant. Looking to the contract, it is plain the
license was a personal privilege. It was given to Samuel Baird,
and not to his assigns. And it was a privilege to be enjoyed
exclusively on the land of McGuire. It was not for the benefit
of any other tenement. It was not appurtenant to any other

DARK v. JOHNSTON.

lands, but it belonged exclusively to the person of the grantee
This is affirmable, not only of the right to explore but of the right
to occupy lands for the purpose of exploration. The latter is only
an incident of the former. It is but adjutory of the former.
When the right to search for oil is gone, the right to occupy land
for such a search is gone with it. That a license is a personal
privilege, and not assignable, is a well-settled principle. It is
induced almost always by confidence in the character of the
licensee. A man may well accord a privilege upon his lands to
one person, which he would refuse to others. Hence it is held
that a personal license is not assignable, and that an assignment
by a licensee determines his right. Though a licensor may be
estopped from recalling the privilege granted, the licensee may
destroy it. He may abandon or release. He qarhot substitute
another to his right. The cases are numerous in which it has
been held that his assignment puts an end to the license: PIie
King v. Hewton, Bridg. 115 ; Hull v, Babcock, 4 Johns. 418;
Prince v. Case, 10 Conn..875; Emmerson v. Fisk, 6 Greenleaf
200. It is true that in Muskett v. Hill, 5 Bing. N. C. 694, it
was ruled that a license to search for and raise metals, and also to
.carry them away and convert them to the licensee's own use,
passes an interest capable of being assigned. But in that case the
license was by indenture, it was given to the licensors, their executors, administrators, and assigns, and the indenture contained
an express provision that the license and authority should be
assignable by deed. The case, therefore, is not in conflict with
the rule that a personal license is not assignable, in which respect
it differs from a grant which carries an interest. Whatever, therefore, might have been Baird's rights had he retained the privilege
given to him by the agreement, his grantees cannot recover in
ejeetment.
This view of the case dispenses with the necessity of consider
ing any other than the fourth assignment of error.
The judgment is reversed.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
SAMUEL McCORMICK ET AL. v. ANDREW HUMPHREYS.
The fifth section of the Act of Congress of March 3d 1863, providing for the
removal of suits against officers and others for acts done under color of authority
of the President or any Act of Congress of the United States, from a state court
to the Circuit Court of the United States, is constitutional.
ON appeal from the Sullivan Circuit.
Andrew Humphreys filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of
Sullivan county, on the first day of February 1866, against
Samuel McCormick and ten others for assault and battery and
false imprisonment.
The allegatons of the complaint were, in substance, that the
defendants, on the 7th of October, 1864, made an assault upon
the plaintiff, and arrested and carried him by force to Indianapolis,
where he was confined and imprisoned in the government building
for a period of three months; that he was removed from thence
to a dungeon in the Soldier's Home, where he was confined for a
further period of three months. The arrest and imprisonment are
alleged to have been without probable cause, and the expenses
incurred in procuring his release are particularly enumerated.
At the February Term, 1866, of the Sullivan Circuit Court,
the defendants, by their attorneys, first appeared to the action,
and moved the court upon a petition then filed, which'was duly
verified by affidavit, "1to remove the cause to the United States
Circuit Court for the District ef Indiana."
The application for removal was under the 5th section of the
Act of Congress of March 3d 1863 (U. S. Stat. at Larg, vol. 12,
p. 756), and the petition set forth that on the 7th of October
1864, the plaintiff was a member of a secret, unlawful and treasonable political organization, called the " Sons of Liberty," the'
object of which was to release 'the rebel prisoners of war then in'
the state of Indiana; that the defendants w6re at the same time
members of the Indiana militia, under the command of MajorGeneral Hughes, who was under command of General Alvin P.
Hovey, at that time, by direction and appointment of the President
of the United States, in command of the military district including the state of Indiana; that by virtue of the orders of the said
General Hughes and General Hovey, the defendants were a part
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of a military force which did arrest the plaintiff and take him to
the city of Indianapolis, which are the supposed trespasses set out
in the complaint; that said arrest was made peaceably and without force or violence, and in pursuance of the said military orders,
and under the authority and by virtue of the laws of the United
States, and by the order and authority of the President of the
United States.
The defendants then offered to file a bond with two sureties,
who were named to the court, conditioned that they should file the
process and other proceedings against them in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the district of Indiana, on the first day of
the next session.
The court, however, overruled the motion to remove, upon
which the defendants excepted and the judge sealed a bill of
exceptions.
After the overruling of the defendants' motion to remove the
cause to the United States court, the cause was continued pending a rule for an answer. At the next term a default was taken,
and the plaintiff's damages were assessed by a jury at $25,000,
for which sum judgment was rendered by the court. The defendants moved to set aside the default and judgment for the reason,
inter alia, that the court hd erred ia overruling the motion'of the
defendants to remove the cause.
The appellants contended that the court below erred in overruling the motion to remove the cause to the Circuit Court of the
United States, and they insisted that all proceedings of the Sullivan Circuit Court, subsequent to the filing of the petition and the
offer to file a bond, are erroneous.
The fourth section of the Act of March 3d 1863, supra, provides, "that any order of the President, or under his authority,
made at any time during the existence of the rebellion, shall be a
defence in all courts to any action, civil or criminal, pending or to
be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest,'or imprisonment,
made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under or
by :virtue of such an order, or under or by virtue of any law of
Congress, and such defence may be made by special plea, or under
the general issue."
The opinion of the court was delivered by
RAY, C. J. (After stating the facts.)-The petition is in form

McCORMICK v. HUEIPHREYS.

and allegation in full compliance with the requirements of the 5tb
section of the Act of Congress. It was filed on entering an
appearance to the suit. It avers facts, which, if true, show that
the trespass or wrong complained of was " done or committed
during the (then) present rebellion," and under color of authority
derived from or exercised under the President of the United
States." It makes out a complete defence to the suit under the
fourth section of the act. It thus presents a case arising under
an Act of Congress; and, admitting the allegations of the petition
to be true, the only question for the court to determine would be
Wrhether or not the fourth section of the Act of Congress was
coihstitutional.
Article 3d, section 2d, of the Constitution of the United States
provides, that "The judicial power (of the United States) shall
extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which
shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which
the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two
or more Etates ; between citizens of different states ; between
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different
states, and between a state or citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects."
It has been decided that a case arises within the meaning of
this provision, as well when the defendant seeks protection under
the laws of Congress, as when a plaintiff comes into court to
demand some right conferred by law: Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264.
The case then presented by the appellants' petition, "arising
under the laws of the United States," comes within the very language of the Constitution, which in express terms, confers upon
the United States courts jurisdiction. The power of Congress to'
provide for the transfer before judgment-of cases which fall
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States cannot
be questioned. . It was provided by the Act of 1789, that suits
commenced in any state court against an alien or by a citizen of
the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another
state, &c., should, upon petition, be thus transferred. The constitutionality of this provision .has been repeatedly declared. The
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jurisdiction depended upon the citizenship of the parties to the
action. By the Act of March 2d 1833, called the "Force Bill,"
provision was made for the removal before judgment of cases arising under the revenue laws. The jurisdiction of the United States
courts, under that act, as under the act now under consideration,
was of the subject-matter of the suit, and did not depend upon
the parties.
The Act of 1833 provided, "that in any case where a suit or
prosecution shall be commenced in a court of any state against
any officer of the United States or oth~er person, for or on account
of any act done under the revenue laws of the United States, or
under color thereof, or for or on account of any right, authority,
or title set up or claimed by such officer or any other person,
under any such law of the United States, it shall be lawful for the
defendant to file his petition," &c.; "and thereupon it shall be the
duty of the said state court to stay all further proceedings," &c.,
(U. S. Stat., vol. 4, p. 6313) If this provision in the'Act of
1833 is constitutional, there can be no question as to the conatitutionality of the same provision of the Act of 1863, where, as in
the case under consideration, the petition presents a complete
aefence under an Act of Congress.
That the provision cited from the Act of 1833 is valid and
effective, has been repeatedly recognised: Wood v. Mathews, 2a
Vt. Rep. 735; Van Zant v, Maxwell, 2 Blatch. C. C. R. 421.
In the case of Freeman v. Bobinson, 7 Ind..323, which was an
action of trespass for injuries committed by Robinson, who was
United States marshal, on Freeman, while the latter was in custody
as a fugitive slave, this court said: "Congress might, no doubt,
have given an action in the Federal courts against an officbr of
the general government-for a personal injury done under color of
office; but we are not informed that it has done so," &c. "As
Congress has not legislated on the subject of this action, we do
not see that it is'possible that there should be any conflict between
'Federal and state authorities."
In Martin v. Hunter, 6 Wheat. R. 678, Judge STORY says:
"It is manifest that this judicial power of the .United States is
unavoidably in some eases exclusive of all state authority, and in
all others may be iiade so at the election of Congress. * * *
Yet if the construction contended for be correct [that the appellato
power conferred by the Constitution does not extend to cases
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originating in state courts, and within their jurisdiction, but only
to cases originating in the inferior Federal courts], it will follow
that as the plaintiff may always elect the state courts, the defendant may always be deprived of all the security which the Constitution intended in aid of his rights. To obviate this difficulty, we
are referred to the power which it is admitted Congress possesses
to remove suits from the state courts to the national courts."
*
*
* * "The existence of this power of removal is familiar
in courts acting according to the course of the common law, in
criminal as well as civil cases, and it -is exercised as well before
as after judgment. But this is always deemed, in both cases, an
exercise of appellate and not of original jurisdiction. If then
the right of removal be included in the appellate jurisdiction, it
is only because it is one mode of exercising that power; and as
Congress is not limited by the Constitution to any particular mode
or time of exercising it, it may authorize a removal either before
or after judgment. The time, the process, and the manner, must
be subject to its absolute legislative control"
The fifth section of the Act of 1863 has been repeatedly held
constitutional. Mr. Justice DAVIS, of the Supreme Court of the
United States, so ruled in the transfer of the case of Athon v'
Morton et al., decided in 1864, in the United States Circuit Court
for the district of Indiana.
It was a suit by Athon, then Secretary of State, against Morton,
Governor, and Noble, Adjutant-General, of the state of Indiana,
to recover fees which the plaintiff claimed as Secretary of State,
on military commissions issued by the defendants without the
attestation of the secretary or seal of the state.
The case was brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Marion
county. An application by the defendants to remove the cause
to -the United States Circuit Court, under the Act of 1863, was
sustained. The ground for the application was that the commissions were issued under a law of Congress. In the United States
Circuit Court.a motion was made to remit the case to the state
court, which was overruled, and jurisdiction of the case was
retained by the :United States court.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in the case Tod, Relator,v. Fairfield Common Pleas,a case which presented the identical question
before us in this record, carefully reviewed the subject and sustained the section of the law, and awarded a mandate to the judge
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of the Common Pleas Court, directing the transfer of the cause:
15 Ohio St. R. 377.
The Supreme Court of New York, in the case of _Aster v.
Butler, sustained the application under the Act of 1863 for
removal. The case is not yet reported.
A decision in favor of the right of removal under the law of
1863, was made by BALLARD, J., in the case of Milton v. Wilgus,
in the United States Circuit Court for the district of Kentucky.
We have the opinion in manuscript from the learned judge who
delivered it, and extract the following paragraph:"I do not consider it necessary to discuss fully the constitutionality of the 5th section of the Act of March 3d 1863, because
its constitutionality has not been disputed by the learned counsel
of the plaintiff. But I may say that whatever doubt or difficulty
I have respecting the constitutionality of the 4th section, I have
none respecting the 5th. For whether or not Congress can make
the order of the President a justification for ' any search, seizure,
arrest, or imprisonment,' made during the rebellion, it is clear
that this is what they have attempted to do in the 4th section..
"And it is equally clear that all persons claiming the protection
of this provision have the right to have its constitutionality determined in the courts of the United States. Whether this provision is or is not constitutional is a question arising under the
Constitution; and being so, it is one to which, by the very terms
of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States
extends. It is precisely.such a question as cannot be finally
decided in a state court, and precisely such an one as !he party
has the right to have removed to the United States court for
decision. Besides, the constitutionality of the 5th section has
been settled by such a train of decisions, and so necessarily follows from numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, that its protracted discussion would be a work of supererogation: ffodgaon v. Milward, 3 Grant's Cases (Penna.) 412;
Id. 418;.- Jones v. Steward, 41 Barb. S. C. 270; Martin v.
Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; 0o1hen v. Virginia, 6 Id. 246."
We know of no case in which it has been held by any court of
final resort that the 5th section of the Act of 1863 was unconsti.
tutional. On the contrary, we believe that a majority of the
judges of the Supreme Court of the United States have upon
the Circuit affirmed its validity.
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But we think the validity of the 5th section of the Act of
Congress may be sustained without reference to the 4th section
of the act.
In October 1864 the armies of the United States were in active
service in the field. To sustain these armies the government was
drawing supplies both of men and material from this state. Its
officers were active in procuring enlistments of recruits for the
military service. Without these supplies from the country in the
rear of the armies, it was impossible to carry forward military
movements or to prosecute the war. Prisoners of war were sent
by the military-officers in command of our forces in the field to
military camps within this state to be guarded and securely kept.
Under these circumstances was it the duty of the President, or
of the military officers in command of this military district under
him, to permit a hostile organization (as is alleged in the petition)
to be formed, armed and fully organized, to act in the interest of
the rebellion, and by force of arms to attempt the release of the
prisoners of war and the destruction of the government? Must
the military commander wait for an actual attack upon the military camps? Must he depend upon the courts to guard his
prisoners of war placed within his charge? Must he permit the
supplies of men and provisions to be cut off, and the country in
the rear of our armies to be occupied by hostile forces ? Must
he wait for the blow to fall, or may -he seize the conspirators
while they are collecting their forces and preparing to strike ?
These are grave questions that may involve not only the liberty
of men who, while claiming to be peaceable citizens, employed in
civil pursuits, were, it is charged, in fact engaged in secretly
organizing a hostile military movement for the destruction of
their government, but the decision of these questions may also
concern the future life of the nation.
Congress, under the Constitution, has the power 'to declare war,"
and "to provide for calling forth the militia" to suppress insurrection. The executive power of the government is vested in the President by the Constitution, and he is made the commander-in-chief of
the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several states when called into the active service of the United
States. When Congress declares war, by that declaration it puts
in force the laws of war, and the war powers of the government,
i hich are not to be exercised under the Constitution in time of
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peace, now come into.full force, and are to be exercised by the
President and Congress. After the declaration of war, every act
in carrying on that war is an act done by virtue of the Constitution, which authorized the war to be commenced. Every measure
of Congress and every executive act performed by the President,
intended and calculated to carry that war to a successful issue,
are acts done under the Constitution, whether the act or the
measure be for the -raising of money to support the armies, or a
declaration of freedom to fill their ranks and weaken the enemy;
whether it be the organization of military tribunals to try traitors,
or the destruction of their property by the advancing army, without due process of law, and the validity of such acts must be
determined by the Constitution. Having by the Constitution the
power to declare war, it follows that, in the language of Chief
Tustice MARSHALL, " Congress must possess the choice of means,
and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution :"
Unite States v. Pisher, 2 Cranch 358. When, therefore, it is
sought to hold any officer or person liable for any act of war,
done under the order of the President, or under any law of Congress, it presents a question "arising under the Constitution" of
the United States, for the power to do the act must be sought in
the Constitution, and, whether that instrument authorized it or
not, is a question of construction, and of that question the courts
of the United States may, under the authority of the Constitution
and The law of Congress, take exclusive jurisdiction. The complaint and the petition in the record before us present such a
question for determination, and Congress has claimed for the.
courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction to determine it.
The recitals and averments of the petition prove the act complained of to have been executed under orders from the military
commander in this district by soldiers and military officers acting
in the military service of the United States ; that act was plainly
done under a claim of military authority and discretion vested
by the Constitution of the United States in the President. The
construction of that instrument, as the source and limit of the
executive war power, will sustain or condemn the act.
That such a defence as is set forth in the petition filed: in the
Circuit Court of Sullivan county presents a question arising under
the Constitution of the United States, was held by Mr. Justice
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of the Supreme Court of the United States, some years
since, in an action of trespass against Commander Hollins, brought
in the New York Common Pleas Court on behalf of the owners of
property destroyed by him in his bombardment of Greytown,
Nicaragua. The cause was removed into the Circuit Court of the
United States, and argued on the point raised that Hollins was
acting under orders from his superior officer, the President, and
therefore was not liable to the plaintiff. To this it was replied that
the President had no poweir to declare war, and that therefore the
act of the President and of Hollins was without show of authority.
The court, on full consideration, ruled that the decision of the
Priesident was final, and justified Hollins in the execution of his
orders: American Cyclop. 1862, p. 512; 4 Blatch. C. C. R., in
press.
But it is insisted that as the appellants were not mustered into
the service of the United States, the act was not therefore done
under color of authority. That the demand for assistance should
have been made upon the governor of the state, and the order to
the defendants to act should have come through Hughes to-him.
It is sufficient answer to say that the defendants acted under the
orders of Hughes, their superior officer, and that he claimed to
act, and therefore did act, under color of the authority of the
military commander of the district of Indiana. Whether the
military commander had the power to .compel Hughes to act or
not is not important, as he submitted to his orders and acted
under them. The case of Fan Zant v. MTkaxwell, supra, deeides
what the w6rds "under color of authority,"-used in the Acts of
1863, as well as in the Act of 1838, included. In that case an
action was brought in the Supreme Court of New York to recover
a part of the proceeds of merchandise condemned for a breach of
the revenue laws, which the plaintiff claimed to be due him as
the informer, upon whose information the goods were seized. The
defendant, who was at the time'collector of the port of New York,
brought a certiorari under the 3d section bf the Act of 1833,
upon which the cause was removed into the Circuit Court of the
United States. .After holding that the act of withholding the
money claimed from the plaintiff was at least colorably an official
act and within the statute, BET.s, J., says: "Nor do we accede
to the argument of the plaintiff's counsel, that the defendant
cannot transfer this cause to this court for the reason that he is
NTLSON,
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sought to be charged in it as a wrongdoer, in withholding
moneys to which the plaintiff has a legal title. That doctrine
would nullify the provisions of the Act of 1833, because, in every
case of prosecution against a collector or other revenue officer,
the action seeks to charge such officer with a personal liability
for acts asserted to have been done wrongfully and without authority of law. Especially is that so in respect to the collector,
when he is sued to recover from him duties levied and exacted on
the importation of goods; for he is then always charged as a
wrongdoer for having obtained and withheld moneys belonging to
the plaintiff, and which he had no right to demand or detain.
"The purpose of the Act of 1833 was to place the jurisdiction
over these questions between individuals and revenue officers in
the Circuit Courts of the United States, to the exclusion of state
courts, and we think the present case is one which falls directly
within the provisions of that statute."
So also in the case already cited of Wood v. Matthews, which
was an action of trespass for-taking a horse, begun in one of the
state courts. The defendant, by a petition under section 3 of the
Act of 1833, removed the cause to the United States Circuit
Court, where a motion was made to remit the cause to the state
court for want of jurisdiction in the Federal court, because the
action did not proceed from or bring in question any act or thing
done by the defendant as an officer under the Revenue Laws of
the United States. In overruling the motion the court say:
"Whether the horse in question was in truth seized and taken by
the defendant, in the exercise of his duty as an officer of the
customs, under the Revenue Laws, as set forth inhis petition for
the removal of the cause, is 'a matter of fact belonging to, and
forming a part of the merits of the case. It is involved in the
inquiry whether the taking and detention were lawful and justifiable, and must be determined, not in a summary way, on motion
and affidavits contradicting and denying'the facts so stated and
verified in the requisite form, but on trial of the merits in the
usual course of proceedings."
In holding that the Circuit Court of the United States for this
district has exclusive jurisdiction of this case, we do not pass
upon the merits of the action and defence as presented by the
complaint and the petition. There is a court having jurisdiction
VoL. XV.-36

